This paper studies the interaction between production subsidies and innovation subsidies. We develop a model which allows us to calculate the socially optimal subsidies (and how 
Introduction 1
Governments in both developed and developing countries offer substantial subsidies/tax credits to privately owned firms. For example, in OECD countries governments finance between 8 and 10% of R&D spending by firms (García-Quevedo, 2004) . In Europe, sugar and dairy processing firms receive large amounts of farm subsidies (Lawrence, 2010) . The U.S. and the EU regularly trade charges of subsidizing their domestic aircraft industry.
2 Large Chinese companies also receive substantial government subsidies (Davis, 2013) , and those subsidies increase firm value (Lee et al., 2010) .
Governments use subsidies as an industrial policy tool to pick winners, to give an advantage to a firm over its (sometimes foreign) competitors, to promote exports, to pursue social policy or environmental objectives, to compensate for market imperfections, or in response to lobbying/capture considerations, for example. Financial support can take different forms: grants, investment subsidies, export subsidies, wage subsidies, R&D subsidies, agricultural price support programs, fuel subsidies in many developing countries, subsidies to consumers when they buy certain products (which also benefit the producers of those products by increasing demand), government procurement, market price support, interest free loans, guarantees to banks, support to ailing firms, tax-deductible borrowing costs, etc. Such subsidies often go against WTO rules, yet they remain widespread for economic and political considerations. Studwell (2013) shows that subsidies, along with other policies, played an important role in the economic development of Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
Yet, most economic models assume that firms behave without explicit government support, except in the presence of some specific externalities or market failures (like underinvestment in innovation or green energy/technology related subsidies). Examples of papers having modelled innovation subsidies only are Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002) , Lahiri and Ono (1999) , and Hall and Laincz (2012) . Most studies find that the optimal innovation subsidy increases with R&D spillovers. Another common finding is that more efficient firms should be subsidized more heavily.
1 I would like to thank Unni Pillai and Roger Ware for their comments, as well as participants to the International Industrial Organization Conference, the conference of the Canadian Economics Association, the EARIE conference, and the conference of La Société canadienne de science économique. I would also like to thank seminar participants at the University of Ottawa for their useful comments and suggestions. 2 See Gössling et al. (2017) for a study of the various forms of subsidies to the aviation sector.
There is no agreement in the empirical literature on whether, or by how much, public subsidies to innovation increase private R&D (see Alonso-Borrego et al. (2012) who review a large number of empirical studies on this topic). Although a substantial number of studies conclude that private R&D responds positively to government support (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2003) . For a review of the empirical literature on this topic, see Atallah (2014) .
A few papers have studied the interaction between production and innovation subsidies. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) study the welfare effects of an R&D subsidy versus an output subsidy in a mixed duopoly. They find that the R&D subsidy is more socially beneficial when spillovers are high, whereas the output subsidy is superior when spillovers are low. However, in their model the government has to choose between the two subsidies, whereas in our framework the government is free to offer both types of subsidies. Moreover, they do not attempt to calculate the socially optimal level of either subsidy.
Leahy and Neary (1997) develop a model with output and innovation subsidies. They find that in the absence of spillovers under Cournot competition (and assuming the government can commit to the optimal output subsidy), R&D should be taxed, as firms over-invest in R&D.
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Whereas under Bertrand competition, R&D should always be subsidized. When the government cannot commit to the output subsidy (and assuming the output subsidy is a strategic complement to R&D), the optimal R&D subsidy is lower than with commitment, and may be positive or negative, with or without R&D cooperation. Lee et al. (2017) study R&D and output subsidies in a mixed duopoly. They focus on privatization, and find that welfare is higher under an output subsidy than under an R&D subsidy.
Moreover, compared to the R&D subsidy, the government has a higher incentive to privatize under the output subsidy. They find that the optimal rate of R&D subsidy is negative, and increases with the degree of privatization. However, they do not consider R&D spillovers, and this probably explains in part their negative R&D subsidy.
Zikos (2007) considers a mixed duopoly with output and R&D subsidies. He allows for the possibility of Stackelberg competition, and for privatization. He finds that the optimal output subsidy is constant. Furthermore, R&D should be taxed, and this taxes varies with privatization and the order of play. However, his model does not take into account R&D spillovers.
Whereas Leahy and Neary (1997) (as well as Kesavayuth and Zikos, 2013) use an output subsidy, we use an input subsidy. While an output subsidy is related to production volume, an input subsidy aims at covering a portion of the cost of some or all inputs. The two subsidies are not equivalent. For example, Parish and McLaren (1982) show, using a theoretical model, that in some cases the input subsidy may be more cost effective to the government than an output subsidy.
Using data from Bangladesh, Nehring (1994) finds that the output subsidy (price support to agricultural products)) is more effective than the input subsidy (on fertilizers). Moreover, in the previously mentioned studies there is no shadow cost of public funds, which we incorporate here.
In this paper we classify subsidies into two main types: a production subsidy, which is proportional to a firm's production costs; and an innovation subsidy, which is proportional to a firm's innovation costs. We develop a model which allows us to calculate the socially optimal subsidies (and how they vary with changes in the economic environment), and to understand how firms react to each type of subsidy.
In a three-stage game, the government chooses production and innovation subsidies in the first stage to maximize welfare in the presence of a shadow cost of public funds; two firms invest in cost-reducing R&D in the second stage; and the two firms compete in quantities in the last stage.
We calculate the optimal subsidies, and analyze how they vary with spillovers and other model parameters. We explore the effect of providing one type of subsidy on the cost of the other subsidy.
We also study strategic interaction between production and innovation subsidies. We then compute the subsidies provided by a government facing a budget constraint. Finally, we study the case where the government has to choose a single subsidy rate that applies to both production and innovation costs.
We find that production subsidies crowd out innovation, since they reduce the gain for firms from investing in R&D. On the other hand, providing a production subsidy reduces the cost of the innovation subsidy, and vice versa. We find that the optimal production subsidy is U-shaped with spillovers, while the innovation subsidy is increasing in spillovers. The production subsidy is higher for very low spillovers, while the innovation subsidy is higher for moderate/high spillovers.
In equilibrium, because of the innovation subsidy, R&D increases with spillovers. Consumer surplus and profits first decrease and then increase with spillovers, whereas welfare always increases with spillovers. We also find that subsidies are more likely to be strategic complements when the production subsidy is low, when the innovation subsidy is high, and when spillovers are low. Optimal subsidies increase with research costs and with the slope of inverse demand, and have an inverted-U shape with respect to initial costs and demand height. A financially constrained government reduces production subsidies much more than innovation subsidies, except for very low spillovers. Surprisingly, the optimal uniform subsidy is not intermediate between the optimal production and innovation subsidies: rather, the uniform subsidy is lower (higher) than both production and innovation subsidies for low (high) spillovers. Moreover, the uniform subsidy induces a negative relationship between R&D and spillovers.
In section 2, we present the model and derive equilibrium output, R&D and subsidies. In section 3, we study the effect of spillovers on optimal subsidies. In section 4, the effects of subsidy rates on subsidy costs are analyzed. Section 5 studies the strategic interaction between innovation and production subsidies. In section 6, we examine the effect of demand and cost parameters on optimal subsidies. In section 7, we consider the effect of financial constraints by varying the shadow cost of public funds, and then by introducing a budget constraint, on the optimal subsidies.
Section 8 examines the case where the government uses a uniform rate to subsidize production and innovation. Section 9 concludes.
The model
Two identical firms producing a homogeneous good invest in cost-reducing R&D before competing à la Cournot. Before firms make any decisions, a social planner chooses the subsidy rates for production costs and innovation costs to maximize welfare. The social planner uses the two instruments to control output and innovation. Demand is given by p(y1,y2) = a -b(y1+y2). Unit costs are
where c is final marginal cost,  is initial marginal cost (before cost-reducing R&D), x is per firm R&D output, and ∈[0,1] is the R&D spillover rate. Parameter values are assumed to be such that in equilibrium, c>0. Profit is given by
where sc∈ [0, 1] is the subsidy to production costs, sx∈ [0, 1] is the subsidy to innovation costs, and  is an R&D cost parameter inversely related to the efficiency of R&D. We call (1-sc)ci the effective marginal cost of firm i.
Consumer surplus is given by
Let industry profits be given by  = 1 + 2 . Welfare is
where >0 is the shadow cost of public funds. The only reason the government subsidizes output in this model is firms' market power: by reducing the effective marginal cost firms face, price is reduced and output is expanded. On the other hand, the need to subsidize innovation is well understood.
It is clear that for very low values of , it will be optimal to subsidize 100% of production and innovation costs (or at least the government will choose high enough subsidies to induce the socially optimal price, output and innovation levels). And for sufficiently high values of , the government will prefer not to provide any subsidy to either production or innovation activities. To focus on an interior solution, we choose the value of  such that the optimal values of sc and sx lie strictly between 0 and 1. We will have more to say about corner solutions when we study optimal subsidies for a financially constrained government in section 7.
In the first stage, the government chooses sc and sx . In the second stage, firms choose R&D investments. In the third and last stage, firms compete in output.
Solving the third stage yields Cournot quantities as a function of R&D outputs and the production subsidy:
Substituting (5) into the profit functions (2) and letting each firm choose its R&D to maximize its profit yields R&D output as a function of the subsidy rates (and other parameters)
The analytical solutions of (6) are quite cumbersome (7 lines of Mathematica output) and are not shown. As firms are identical ex ante, the equilibrium is symmetric.
Substituting (6) into welfare (4) and letting the social planner choose sc and sx to maximize welfare yields the optimal subsidies 4 ( , , , , , ), ( , , , , , ).
The analytical complexity of the model makes it impossible to derive a closed-form solution without first assigning numerical values to the parameters a, b, α, ,  and . We use the following numerical configuration as the "base" configuration: a=1000, b=1, =50, =0.4, =60, and =0.27. 5 To study the effects of any parameter on the equilibrium, we fix all other parameters following the base configuration, and allow that parameter to vary. Alternative numerical configurations have been used, and the results remain unchanged qualitatively. All results will be illustrated graphically, and evaluated at discrete values of the parameter under study.
Effect of R&D spillovers on optimal production and innovation subsidies
In this section we analyze the effect of spillovers on optimal subsidies, on the marginal benefits and costs of subsidies, and on consumer surplus, profits and welfare. Before considering the effect of spillovers, first we note that R&D decreases with sc . To see that, we fix other parameter values, we fix sx at 0.2 and β at 0.4 (the specific values of these variables are irrelevant for the relationship), and plot x as a function of sc (see figure 1). 6 Firms respond to an increase in the production subsidy by reducing their investments in innovation. An increase in sc induces four effects on the innovation incentives of firm i. First, a reduction in the effective marginal cost (1-sc)ci, reducing the incentives to innovate; in the limit, if 100% of production costs were subsidized, firms would have no incentive at all to invest in innovation. Second, a reduction in the effective marginal cost of the competitor; this reduces the incentives of firm i to invest in R&D. Third, an increase in output yi (because of the reduction in the effective marginal cost of firm i); this effect increases the incentives to innovate. Fourth, a reduction in xj; this increases (decreases) the optimal xi for firm i for low (high) spillovers. The sum of the negative effects always dominates the sum of the positive effects; hence, production subsidies crowd out innovative activities.
Proposition 1.
< 0.
Consider now the effect of β on the optimal subsidies. We have the following result.
Proposition 2. The optimal production subsidy first decreases, then increases, with . The optimal innovation subsidy uniformly increases with . Figure 2 illustrates the effect of  on both subsidies. To understand these relationships, we write the f.o.c. determining sc and sx . Let c represent the total cost of the production subsidy to the government:
and let x represent the total cost of the innovation subsidy to the government:
Then we can write the f.o.c. for the choice of sc as
Similarly, we can write the f.o.c. for the choice of sx as
As these expressions are hopelessly complicated analytically, we analyze them graphically, with all variables (including subsidies) taking their equilibrium values. 1) and 2) The marginal benefits of sc to consumers and firms decrease with spillovers. As spillovers increase, costs decrease (because R&D increases), and a given increase in sc leads to a smaller reduction in costs (for firms) and in prices (for consumers) in dollar terms.
3) The marginal effect of sc on c increases with spillovers (even when sc itself decreases with spillovers, 7 which occurs for low spillovers; see figure 2). Even though costs decrease with spillovers, the output expansion that occurs as a result of the lower costs increases the marginal cost of the production subsidy to the government.
4) Finally, we note that < 0 (see figure 3 ): the cost of the innovation subsidy decreases with the production subsidy because an increase in sc reduces production costs, reducing the incentives for firms to invest in innovation, reducing x (for a given level of sx).
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Moreover, this effect is reinforced by spillovers: the innovation subsidy is very expensive for high spillovers (because x is high), thus the reduction in x in dollar terms increases with  ; furthermore, >0 for high , reinforcing this effect.
We can now understand the U-shaped relationship between sc and  illustrated in figure 2.
The production subsidy first decreases with  ; in this range, the marginal benefits of sc to 7 This follows from the result that R&D increases with spillovers (see proposition 4 below). 8 This point will be proven in the next section. 
. Marginal effects of a production subsidy
Effect on consumer surplus Effect on profits Effect on production subsidy costs Effect on innovation subsidy costs Note: a=1000; b=1; =50; =60; =0.27.
consumers and firms are decreasing in , and is increasing in . Moreover, in this range the benefits to the government from the reduction in x are still small. For high , however, becomes very significant, leading to an increase in the optimal production subsidy. Hence, the main reason the government increases the production subsidy with spillovers (for high spillovers)
is to reduce the cost of the innovation subsidy.
Using the same method, we then illustrate graphically the four terms composing the f.o.c.
determining sx (see figure 4) from equation (11).
1 and 2) The marginal benefits of sx to consumers and firms increase with spillovers: as  increases, firms would like to reduce their R&D; at the same time, the social benefit from R&D increases for consumers (lower prices through a stronger cost reduction because of spillovers) and for the competitor (lower costs).
3) increases steeply with spillovers: as spillovers increase, sx increases, and given the quadratic R&D costs, the cost of the innovation subsidy increases sharply.
4) Here too there are synergies between the two subsidies: <0, that is, the innovation subsidy reduces the cost of the production subsidy. We can now explain why the innovation subsidy increases with spillovers. As  increases, the marginal benefits of sx to firms and consumers increase, and the reduction in the cost of the production subsidy increases; these benefits outweigh the steep increase in the marginal cost of the innovation subsidy with spillovers, leading to a positive relationship between sx and . The optimal sx would increase with  even in the absence of a production subsidy; but the effect < 0 makes the optimal sx increase even faster with .
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate that the marginal effects of subsidies on own and cross subsidy costs are more important than the marginal gains of the subsidies to consumers and firms; thus it is mainly cost considerations, rather than benefit considerations, which drive the socially optimal subsidy rates.
Moreover, note (from figure 2) that for low , sc > sx : for this range of , the underinvestment in innovation is not too severe, and the production subsidy is higher. However, for high , the underinvestment in innovation is significant, and sc < sx . More precisely, the four effects identified in equations (10) and (11) (and illustrated in figures 3 and 4) result in a higher sc for low  and a higher sx for high . This result is consistent with the results of Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) who also find that the innovation (production) subsidy is more socially valuable when spillovers are high (low).
However, in their model the government has to choose between the two types of subsidies.
Moreover, here, in contrast to Leahy and Neary (1997) and Petrakis and Poyago-Theotoky (2002) , it is never optimal to tax R&D, even for low spillovers. This is because the positive production subsidy depresses R&D sufficiently that a positive R&D subsidy is always called for.
It is useful at this stage to plot equilibrium R&D as a function of spillovers. It is well know that in the absence of subsidies, innovation decreases with spillovers (d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988). The innovation subsidy reverses this result. Figure 5 plots R&D as a function of spillovers. As the figure shows, R&D increases uniformly with spillovers. This is because of the innovation subsidy, which increases with spillovers; this increase more than compensates for the decline in innovation incentives due to higher leakages. The socially optimal rate of innovation increases as spillovers increase (the positive externality on the competitor becomes more important). As spillovers increase, the government increases the innovation subsidy sufficiently to induce an increase in innovation (again, see the decomposition in figure 4 to understand precisely why sx increases with  ). Another reason why R&D increases with spillovers is that output increases with spillovers (because unit cost decreases with spillovers), increasing the value of cost reduction, inducing firms to invest more in R&D. While this result is derived in the presence of production and innovation subsidies, it can be shown that the innovation subsidy alone is sufficient to generate this positive relationship between R&D and spillovers.
The results of this model shed light on the debate regarding the optimal degree of intellectual property protection, (here) in the presence of production and innovation subsidies. To verify whether society gains or loses from stronger IPRs, figure 6 plots industry profits, consumer surplus, and welfare as a function of spillovers, when all variables, including sc and sx , take their equilibrium values. As the figure shows, consumer surplus and profits first decrease then increase with spillovers. The initial decrease is due to the decrease in sc for low , which increases costs and prices. However, for moderate to high values of , consumer surplus and profits increase with . Over this range, R&D is higher (it is always increasing with  ), and sc (eventually) comes to rise with . And consumer surplus starts to rise with spillovers earlier than profits. On the other hand, welfare uniformly increases with . Even when consumer surplus and profits are decreasing in  (for low  ), welfare rises with , due to the increase in R&D, and to the decrease in c . But all economic agents prefer very high spillovers to very low spillovers (even firms, who normally would lose from weaker IPRs) in the presence of properly chosen subsidies. This is in contrast to the result that, in the absence of subsidies, profits and welfare have an inverted-U shape with respect to spillovers; see Stepanova (2009) , for example.
Proposition 5. Consumer surplus and profits are U-shaped with respect to spillovers (and are
maximized with perfect spillovers), while welfare always increases with spillovers.
Effects of subsidy rates on subsidy costs
In this section we formalize the effect of subsidy rates on the cost of subsidies to the government; some of these effects were discussed above. Consider first the effect of sc on c . From Consider next the effect of sx on x . From (9), x depends (for fixed  and ) on sx and x.
As >0, it follows that >0. The following equation summarizes the effect of an increase in sx on x :
Consider now the effect of a type of subsidy on the cost of the other subsidy. An increase in sx reduces unit cost c and increases y, hence the sign of is a priori ambiguous. To verify which effect dominates, we plot c as a function of sx . As figure 7 shows, 10 the relationship is negative, indicating that the decline in costs is more important than the increase in output, and meaning that a higher innovation subsidy rate reduces the total cost of the production subsidy.
Moreover, as figure 7 shows, the decrease in c can be substantial: when sx goes from 0 to 0.8, c
is reduced almost by half. 11 Moreover, as figure 4 shows, this effect is more pronounced for high spillovers. With high spillovers, output is higher (due to lower costs), making c higher, making the economies from a higher sx more important.
10 On this figure sx stops at 0.8, because for higher values of sx some endogenous variables (like c) become negative.
11 It is important not to confuse the effect of sx on the marginal cost of the production subsidy,
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, which may be positive or negative, with the effect of sx on the total cost of the production subsidy, , which is always negative. The following equation summarizes the effect of an increase in sx on c :
Next, consider the effect of sc on x . As <0, it follows that <0: a higher production subsidy rate reduces the total cost of the innovation subsidy. As sc increases, production costs decrease. This reduces the incentives of firms to invest in R&D (for a given sx), reducing the cost of a given sx to the government. Also, this effect becomes more pronounced (more negative) as  increases (see figure 3 ): a higher  means higher R&D and a higher sx (which translate into a higher x), making the savings from a higher sc more important. The following equation summarizes the effect of an increase in sc on x :
It is easy to verify that the positive own cost effect is always larger than the negative cross effect, so that an increase in any subsidy rate always increases total subsidy costs.
Proposition 6. An increase in one subsidy rate always increases the total cost of that subsidy and
total subsidy costs, and reduces the total cost of the other subsidy.
Strategic interaction between production and innovation subsidies
It is useful to examine the strategic interaction between sc and sx . Does the government view them as strategic complements or substitutes? The sign of 2 is illustrated in figure 8 for three spillover values: =0, 0.4, and 1. This figure shows that sc and sx are more likely to be strategic complements when sc is low, when sx is high, and when  is low.
To understand this result, from (4) we differentiate W w.r.t. sx and sc :
The first term,
2
, is found to be negative: increases in either subsidy reduce the gain of the other subsidy to consumers, since both subsidies reduce costs and prices, and the marginal gain is lower when we start from a lower level of costs or prices. Moreover, this effect is found to be more 
. Strategic interaction
pronounced when sc is low and sx is high. But its overall magnitude is not large enough to dominate the other terms and have a strong effect on strategic interaction.
The second term, 2  , tends to be positive (negative) with low (high) spillovers. And its magnitude (in absolute value) increases with sx and decreases with sc : an increase in the innovation subsidy is most useful when sc is low. But its magnitude is the smallest among the four terms, and has no effect whatsoever on the sign of (12).
The third term, which can also be written as 2 , represents the effect of the innovation subsidy on the marginal cost of the production subsidy. It tends to be positive (negative) when sc is high (low), and its magnitude (in absolute value) increases with spillovers. When sc is low, an increase in sx reduces the marginal cost of sc : the increase in sx boosts innovation, reducing costs, and reducing the cost of sc . However, when sc is high, the increase in sx , which also increases output, raises the marginal cost of the production subsidy significantly (remember that = (1 + ) ( 1 1 + 2 2 )). The magnitude of this term relative to the three other terms becomes critical when sc is high and sx is low; in that case it is the main factor behind strategic substitutability between sc and sx .
The last term, 2 , is negative. It becomes more negative when sc is low, when sx is high, and when spillovers are low. It dominates all the other terms combined when it is large in absolute value, and is the main driver of strategic complementarity between subsidies. An increase in sc reduces innovation (see figure 1) , reducing the marginal cost of the innovation subsidy. When sx is small and sc is large, x is small, thus the effect of sc , while still present, is less important, and the third term above dominates.
Proposition 7. sc and sx are more likely to be strategic complements when sc is low, when sx is
high, and when spillovers are low. Otherwise, they are more likely to be strategic substitutes. In equilibrium, they are always strategic complements.
The strategic interaction between production and innovation subsidies is mainly driven by cost considerations, rather than the gains to consumers or firms from those subsidies. Furthermore, even though sc and sx may be strategic complements or substitutes, in equilibrium they are always strategic complements (given the choices of sc and sx by the government).
Effect of other parameters on the optimal subsidies
In this section we study the comparative statics of the model with respect to demand and cost parameters. Consider first the effect of the height of the inverse demand curve (a) on subsidies.
As figure 9 shows, the optimal subsidies have an inverted-U shape with a. Initially, the subsidies grow with market size, since a larger market benefits more from lower production costs and higher R&D spending (both boost output). However, as market size continues to increase, the cost of both subsidies to the government increases. First, output expands, increasing the cost of the output subsidy. Second, innovation increases with market size for given subsidies, increasing the cost of the innovation subsidy (especially with quadratic innovation costs). These cost increases induce the government to reduce the subsidy rates.
Note that while this figure suggests that sc < sx , this is just an artifact of the fact that the figure is drawn for =0.4. If we were to draw the same figure for very low , the overall shapes would be the same, but we would have sc > sx . This is also true for figures 10, 11 and 12. The ranking of sc and sx depends solely on β, as shown in figure 2. Figure 10 shows the relationship between the optimal subsidies and the slope of the inverse demand curve, b. As b increases, the optimal subsidies increase. A higher b means a less elastic demand, and thus a lower gain from innovation, since a given reduction in costs leads to a lesser expansion in output. Thus firms reduce their investments in R&D, which reduces output and increases price. To counter these effects, the government increases production and innovation subsidies, to reduce price and increase innovation incentives (in the way increasing output). Figure 11 illustrates the relationship between the optimal subsidies and initial marginal cost: an inverted-U. For very low , the market is very large, subsidies are very expensive, and the government chooses low subsidy rates. As  increases, the market shrinks, the subsidy costs become more manageable, and the subsidies are increasing in . However, as  increases further, the market shrinks, and the gain from a dollar of production or innovation subsidies is lower. Thus, the subsidy rates are reduced. Subsidy rates are highest for "intermediate" values of . A similar effect was observed in figure 9 above, where subsidy rates were highest for "intermediate" values
of the demand intercept. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) argue, intuitively, that higher production costs reduce the attractiveness to society of a production subsidy (relative to an innovation subsidy). Our results
show that this intuition is not correct: the relationship between the optimal production subsidy (as well as the optimal innovation subsidy) and production costs is non-monotonic. Figure 12 shows that as the cost of doing research increases, the optimal subsidies increase.
A higher  means lower innovation, lower output and a higher price. To counter those effects, the government responds by increasing both production and innovation subsidies. Note: a=1000; b=1; =50; =0.4; =0.27. Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) argue, intuitively, that higher research costs reduce the attractiveness to society of an innovation subsidy (relative to an output subsidy). Our results show that this intuition is not correct: Higher research costs actually increase the innovation subsidy rate (as well as the production subsidy rate).
Proposition 8 summarizes the results of this section.
Proposition 8. Production and innovation subsidies: i) first increase then decrease with the height of the inverse demand curve (a) and initial marginal cost ();
ii) increase with the slope of inverse demand (b) and research costs ();
The two subsidies behave differently w.r.t. spillovers (see figure 2 ), but behave similarly w.r.t. to the parameters mentioned in the last proposition. Moreover, not all costs are created equal: higher research costs increase both subsidies, while higher production costs first increase then decrease subsidy rates. Finally, note that sc and sx tend to move in tandem (except with β for low β), reflecting the strategic complementarity (in equilibrium) between them.
A financially constrained government
In the previous analysis we considered the case where the government had enough funds to implement the socially optimal subsidy rates (given the positive shadow cost of public funds).
In some cases, however, governments may have limited funds available (or legally allowed) for subsidies, and may have to underinvest in one or both subsidies relative to the socially optimal rates. In this section we ask how a financially constrained government should allocate its limited resources between production and innovation subsidies. We address this question in two ways:
first by looking at the effect of changes in the shadow cost of public funds, then by explicitly introducing a budget constraint.
The shadow cost of public funds
Consider first the shadow cost of public funds. Figure 13 shows the effect of the shadow cost of public funds on subsidies. Figure 13a , which is drawn with =0.4, shows that for very low , both subsidies take a value of 1. For very high  (not shown for sx), both take a value of zero.
In between, both subsidies tend to lie strictly between 0 and 1. Note that sc reaches zero before sx does. That is, when public funds are rather costly (but not extremely costly) and spillovers are significant, it is worth to subsidize innovation, but not production. Figure 13b shows the same analysis as figure 13a , but with =0. The results are overall similar, except for two important differences. First, sx<sc , since the low spillover rate implies that the underinvestment in innovation is not too significant. Second, on this figure, sc goes to zero much more rapidly than sx went to zero in figure 13a . That is, when the shadow cost of public funds is rather high (but not extremely high), it is optimal to offer no subsidies at all when spillovers are low, and to subsidize innovation only when spillovers are high. It takes a much higher shadow cost of public funds to bring the innovation subsidy to zero, than to bring the production subsidy to zero. 
An explicit budget constraint
We now introduce an explicit budget constraint, leaving  unchanged. We assume that the financially constrained government disposes of only 10% of the budget required to implement the first best subsidies (for any given parameter values). We want to inquire how the government will allocate these limited funds between production and innovation subsidies. Let = + represent the total cost of subsidies for a financially unconstrained government. For each spillover level, we calculate K, and then, at the first stage, we maximize welfare subject to the constraint:
Let and represent optimal subsidies when the government faces the constraint (13). Figure 14 illustrates the constrained and unconstrained subsidies. Naturally, both subsidies are lower due to the budget constraint. But the decline in sc is much more important than the decline in sx . Only for very low spillovers do we have > (the two curves cross earlier than without the financial constraint; see figure 2). declines with spillovers, and does not have a U-shaped form as it does without the constraint. It reaches zero (or almost), and stays there for higher levels of spillovers. , on the other hand, increases steadily with spillovers, and reaches a non-negligible proportion of its unconstrained level.
This result is consistent with our previous results: the cost of sc tends to be much higher than the cost of sx for a wide range of parameter values, 12 and a financially constrained government gives priority to innovation subsidies over production subsidies. Moreover, because both subsidies are below their optimal levels, the benefit of each subsidy in terms of reducing the cost of the other subsidy (see figures 3 and 4) is less important, making the subsidies even more expensive. Thus, to contain subsidization costs, the government prefers to raise sx and reduce sc as  increases, except for very low .
Proposition 9. Budgetary constraints reduce production subsidies much more than innovation subsidies, except for very low spillovers.
12 It can be shown, numerically, that only when sc gets close to zero (in the unconstrained model for high a and high α; see figures 9 and 11) do we get x > c . For most parameter values, even though sx > sc , we have that x < c . In the real world, trade agreements make it harder to provide 100% of the socially optimal production subsidy, but do not place the same limitations on innovation subsidies. Innovation first increases with spillovers, because of the steep increase in . However, as spillovers increase further, the disincentives from leakages become too important, and R&D spending decreases with spillovers. Moreover, R&D spending is higher (lower) than in the basic model for low (high) spillovers. As the budget constraint becomes even more strict (say, 5%), we would expect R&D to increase even more for low spillovers, and to decrease even more for high spillovers (relative to the basic model). Another way of reading that figure is to say that R&D is relatively high for low β because of the low production subsidy, while R&D is low for high β because of the (relatively) low innovation subsidy.
Proposition 10. Under a government budget constraint (with only 10% of the budget required to
implement the first best subsidies), R&D spending has an inverted-U shape with spillovers.
Moreover, it exceeds R&D spending in the basic model iff spillovers are low enough.
The results from sections 7.1 and 7.2 are in agreement that for low β, sc is more important, while for high enough β, sx is more important. But section 7.2 makes it clearer that with limited funds, priority is given to sc for a very narrow range of spillovers. Even in the unconstrained case, sx overtakes sc from a very low value of spillovers. The results with a relatively high shadow cost of public funds, or with an explicit budget constraint, are in a sense more realistic than the fully unconstrained model, since governments are rarely in the comfortable financial position that would allow them to fully eradicate the effects of market power through high (and expensive) production and innovation subsidies.
A uniform subsidy
In some instances the government may want to set a uniform subsidy rate that does not distinguish between production and innovation activities. This may be the case when it cannot clearly separate production costs from innovation costs, and firms may try to profit from subsidy rates differentials by classifying more expenses in the category with a higher subsidy rate.
Let everything be as in section 2, except that the government adopts a uniform subsidy rate, su, that applies to both production and innovation costs. Maximizing (4) subject to this constraint yields the optimal su, illustrated in figure 16 . First we note that su increases uniformly with  (until it reaches the maximum su=1), indicating that the desire of the social planner to finance an increasing portion of innovation activities (as  increases) outweighs the desire to reduce the subsidization of production activities (as  increases) when spillovers are sufficiently low. 
In figure 17 , the sum of the marginal benefits minus the sum of marginal costs always equals zero. As the figure shows, the marginal effect of su on c and x is always positive.
Moreover, the marginal benefit of su to consumers is U-shaped with spillovers: the negative slope for low  mimics the decline of the marginal benefit of sc (figure 3), while the positive slope for high  mimics the positive slope of the marginal benefit of sx (figure 4). For firms, the marginal benefit of su decreases with spillovers (as in figure 3 for sc , and differently from figure 4, where the marginal benefit of firms from sx increased with  ), indicating that, with a uniform subsidy, the effect on production incentives dominates the effect on innovation incentives. Hence to reduce innovation incentives (for low  ), the government is forced to also reduce production incentives. As  increases, the government wants to increase innovation; this also forces it to increase production incentives; however, as the latter are increased, firms want to perform less R&D; this pushes the government to increase su even further. That's why su very quickly overtakes sc and sx . For very high , the government sets su at its maximum value (a corner solution) to compensate for the fact that the very high production incentives reduce firms' willingness to invest in R&D, in spite of the high innovation incentives. To obtain an interior solution for very high  would require a higher shadow cost of public funds, but to maintain comparability with the basic model we leave  unchanged.
To confirm that innovation incentives are lower here most of the time than in section 2, figure 18 plots R&D with a uniform subsidy (xu), and compares it with R&D from section 2. Note that xu decreases uniformly with spillovers, in spite of the fact that su increases with spillovers.
Moreover, xu is higher than R&D in the basic model only for very low spillovers (because of low  and a low sc). For moderate/high spillovers, even though su > sc , sx , R&D with the uniform subsidy is smaller than R&D in the basic model. Hence, a uniform subsidy is not a very good instrument to stimulate innovation, since most of the benefits of the innovation incentives are cancelled by the high production subsidy. Naturally, welfare also is lower with a uniform subsidy than with differentiated subsidies (and welfare with no subsidy at all is the lowest). Note: a=1000; b=1; =50; =60; =0.27.
Proposition 11.
A uniform subsidy applied to both production and innovation increases R&D for low spillovers but decreases it for moderate/high spillovers. Moreover, <0 .
One would have thought that because the two subsidies move in tandem with most parameters (except β) in the unconstrained model, and since their levels are quite close, a uniform subsidy would achieve an equilibrium which is close to the equilibrium with unconstrained subsidies. But as the results of this section show, the uniform subsidy changes radically the dynamics of subsidization, leading to much inferior outcomes.
It is interesting to note how the relationship between innovation and spillovers depends on the context. In the absence of subsidies, or with a production subsidy only, or with a uniform subsidy, R&D decreases with spillovers. In the presence of an innovation subsidy -combined or not with a production subsidy, (or with R&D cooperation with or without subsidies), R&D increases with spillovers. And under a government budget constraint, R&D has an inverted-U shape w.r.t. spillovers. Table 1 summarizes the different cases. 
Conclusions
In this paper we considered the interaction between production subsidies (to reduce production costs) and innovation subsidies (to reduce innovation costs). We allowed a benevolent government to invest in both, and identified important interactions between them. It was shown that production subsidies crowd out innovation. We also showed that providing a production subsidy reduces the cost of the innovation subsidy, and vice versa. The optimal production subsidy is U-shaped with spillovers, while the innovation subsidy is increasing in spillovers. The production subsidy is higher for very low spillovers, while the innovation subsidy is higher for moderate/high spillovers. In equilibrium, because of the innovation subsidy, R&D and welfare increase with spillovers. However, consumer surplus and profits first increase then decrease with spillovers. We also studied the strategic interaction between the two types of subsidies, and showed that they can be strategic complements or substitutes, but are always strategic complements in equilibrium. We analyzed how optimal subsidies change with demand and cost parameters. We studied how a financially constrained government chooses subsidies. Finally, we calculated the optimal uniform subsidy, which applies to production and innovation costs.
There is an asymmetry in the effects of the two subsidies. Production subsidies reduce innovation, but provide a benefit to consumers by reducing prices, and to the government by reducing the cost of the innovation subsidy. The innovation subsidy, on the other hand, benefits consumers and firms, and reduces the cost of the production subsidy.
The model sheds light on significant interactions between production subsidies, innovation subsidies, and spillovers. Optimal innovation and production subsidies cannot be calculated separately: governments should have integrated industrial and innovation policies, especially since each type of subsidy reduces the cost of the other subsidy. Moreover, when subsidizing production, governments have to take into account the possible crowding out of innovation. A lump sum production subsidy (or an output subsidy), while harder to justify economically and politically, avoids the disincentive that a production subsidy (which is proportional to costs) has on innovation.
This crowding out effect is less important for goods for which process innovation possibilities are nil or very low.
